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Notes
AVOIDING MERE INCANTATIONS:
EVALUATING SUCCESS ON NONFEE CLAIMS
WHEN DETERMINING PREVAILING-PARTY
STATUS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1988
JESSICA L. BRUMLEY†
ABSTRACT
The American rule dictates that regardless of the outcome, parties
pay for their own attorneys’ fees unless Congress has specifically
enacted a fee-shifting statute authorizing courts to award fees to
prevailing parties. One of the most recognized fee-shifting statutes is
42 U.S.C. § 1988. Courts and scholars have extensively discussed
whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party under § 1988. Yet both have
largely ignored one scenario in which a plaintiff files a suit containing
both constitutional claims for which fees are authorized under § 1988
(fee claims) and state law claims for which fees are not authorized
(nonfee claims). Courts then, invoking the avoidance doctrine, simply
rule on the state law claim and leave the constitutional claim
unaddressed. In this scenario, is the plaintiff a prevailing party under
§ 1988? The few courts that have addressed this question have
adopted a rule that unnecessarily favors plaintiffs at the expense of
defendants by allowing courts to award fees without finding that the
defendants violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. It also creates a
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system that is ripe for abuse—one in which plaintiffs can use pleading
tricks to obtain fee awards with “mere incantations” of fee claims.
This Note proposes revising this rule by requiring that the fee and
nonfee claims be reasonably related, with a heavy emphasis on
whether they are based on related legal theories. This new rule would
still let courts invoke the avoidance doctrine but would better protect
defendants without unnecessarily burdening plaintiffs.

INTRODUCTION
Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other civil rights statutes
to give private citizens and businesses the power to sue the
government when it violates their constitutional or federal statutory
rights. Recognizing that many victims of constitutional violations
cannot afford to bring civil suits, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
which gives courts the power to make defendants pay the attorneys’
fees of plaintiffs that prevail on certain civil rights claims, called fee
claims. But § 1988 fails to address a critical procedural issue: what
happens when plaintiffs bring both fee claims and nonfee claims
(those based on laws not covered by § 1988, such as state statutes)
and win only on those other (nonfee) grounds? Should defendants
have to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees anyway?
In 2007, the Fourth Circuit confronted just this problem. In
1
Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, the City of
Greensboro passed an ordinance limiting where “sexually oriented
2
businesses” could locate in the city. Giovanni Carandola, Ltd.
(Carandola), along with five other adult businesses, filed a § 1983 suit
3
alleging the city violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Carandola additionally included a nonfee claim that it was not subject
4
to the ordinance as written. Carandola moved for summary judgment
5
based only on the nonfee claim. The court granted summary
judgment for Carandola on the nonfee claim but did not rule on the
6
fee claim.

1. Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, 258 F. App’x 512 (4th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
2. Id. at 514.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; Plaintiff-Appellants’ Supplemental Brief in Case Number 07-1249, at 9, Carandola,
258 F. App’x 512 (Nos. 06-2181 & 07-1249), 2007 WL 1974220.
6. Carandola, 258 F. App’x at 514, 516.
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Had Carandola won the § 1983 claim, the court could have
required Greensboro to pay Carandola’s attorney’s fees under § 1988.
Absent any § 1983 claim, however, the American rule—the
traditional rule of attorney compensation—would have required
Carandola to pay its own fees. The Fourth Circuit ultimately and
correctly decided that the fee claims and the nonfee claims were too
7
unrelated to justify holding that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties.
8
But its reasoning was unclear, and other courts have reached the
9
opposite result.
The problem the Fourth Circuit faced was how to reconcile two
competing policy goals: encouraging civil rights suits and protecting
defendants from paying attorneys’ fees for meritless claims. Congress
enacted § 1988 to encourage plaintiffs to bring suits to vindicate their
10
civil rights. But the text of § 1988 assumes that courts reached
decisions on the merits of fee claims. In practice, however, the rule of
avoidance occasionally hinders plaintiffs. This rule asks courts to
avoid deciding constitutional claims when they can reach a decision
11
on other grounds. So in situations like Carandola, in which courts do
12
not address fee claims, courts often fail to decide fee claims that may
have merit. If plaintiffs never receive attorneys’ fees in Carandolalike situations, then courts undermine the purpose of
§ 1988. But § 1988 makes losing defendants pay more than in ordinary
litigation under the American rule. As a result, forcing defendants to
pay attorneys’ fees in Carandola-like situations for potentially
meritless fee claims seems unfair. Indeed, it could encourage plaintiffs
to tack on a meritless fee claim—to bring it as a “mere
13
incantation” —just to recover attorneys’ fees.
To avoid this unfairness and potential abuse, courts that have
faced this issue agree that some relationship must exist between the

7. Id. at 514.
8. See infra Part II.B.2.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part I.
11. Carandola, 258 F. App’x at 517–18 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976)). For
more on the avoidance doctrine, see infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
12. In fact, the Carandola court did not invoke the avoidance doctrine. The plaintiffs
simply had not put the fee claim before the court on summary judgment. Carandola, 258 F.
App’x at 518. For the purposes of this Note, however, Carandola is portrayed as a typical
situation in which courts struggle with Gagne and Smith.
13. Smith v. Cumberland Sch. Comm., 703 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1983), aff’d sub nom. Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
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fee claim and the other, nonfee claim on which the plaintiff prevails.
15
But courts cannot agree how related those claims must be. The
Supreme Court has addressed this issue twice, first in Maher v.
16
17
Gagne and then again in Smith v. Robinson. In Gagne, the Court
cursorily established a two-prong rule—what this Note calls the
Gagne rule—that allows fees (1) if the fee claim is “substantial” and
(2) if the fee claim and nonfee claim arise from a “common nucleus of
18
operative fact.” Recognizing that Gagne’s two-prong test allowed
attorneys’ fees too easily, the Smith Court clarified that fee claims
19
must be “reasonably related to the plaintiff’s ultimate success.” But
the Court did not explain how courts should incorporate Smith into
the existing Gagne rule.
As a result, lower courts have struggled to apply Gagne and
20
Smith in Carandola-like situations. Their confusion, in turn, has
undermined the purpose of § 1988—without a fairly balanced test,
either undeserving plaintiffs can obtain attorneys’ fees at the
defendants’ expense or victims of constitutional violations are
discouraged from suing. Interestingly, scholars have largely ignored
this confusion among the courts. Although scholars have debated
other aspects of fee-shifting statutes, they have not seriously discussed
the relationship between Gagne and Smith. The handful of articles
that do address the two-prong Gagne rule and the later Smith
modifications merely mention that Smith restricted the two-prong
Gagne rule, but they neither point out that courts have failed to
incorporate these restrictions nor propose any method for properly
21
recognizing the impact of Smith.
This Note, then, provides the first analysis of the proper
circumstances for courts to award attorneys’ fees under § 1988 in
Carandola-like situations. After considering several possible
approaches, it argues that courts should make the Smith rule the third
prong of the Gagne test. Before awarding fees in situations similar to
the Carandola case, courts should find that (1) the fee claim is
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
17. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
18. Gagne, 448 U.S. at 132 & n.15.
19. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1007.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. E.g., Erika Geetter, Comment, Attorney’s Fees for § 1983 Claims in Fair Hearings:
Rethinking Current Jurisprudence, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1267, 1277–78 (1988).
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substantial; (2) the fee claim and nonfee claim arise from a common
nucleus of operative fact; and (3) the fee claim is reasonably related
to the plaintiff’s ultimate success, focusing primarily on whether the
fee and nonfee claims present related legal theories. This solution
best resolves the competing policy concerns that § 1988 attempts to
balance.
Part I of this Note gives the legislative history of § 1988 and
explains the policy concerns that underpin it. Part II presents courts’
responses to the problem this Note addresses. It explores the Court’s
reasoning in the Gagne decision and explains why it modified the
Gagne standard in Smith. It then shows the variety of approaches
lower courts have taken to apply Gagne and Smith. Part III considers
the benefits and drawbacks of their approaches and sets out the
proposed three-prong test.
I. THE HISTORY AND COMPETING POLICY PURPOSES OF § 1988
Under the American rule, litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees
regardless of who wins, unless a statute or an enforceable contract
22
provision authorizes fee shifting. In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
23
Wilderness Society, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of
the American rule and held that only Congress could shift fees and
only through “specific and explicit [statutory authorizations] for the
24
allowance of attorneys’ fees.” Congress quickly exercised that power
and passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976
25
(§ 1988). When it enacted § 1988, Congress primarily focused on
26
encouraging plaintiffs to go to court to vindicate their civil rights.
Congress understood that it needed private enforcement by citizens

22. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 257 (1975). For an
excellent history on the American rule, see generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (Winter 1984).
23. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
24. Id. at 260.
25. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)).
26. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. S16251 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Sen. Scott),
reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., CIVIL RIGHTS
ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 (PUBLIC LAW 94559, S. 2278): SOURCE BOOK:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 19 (Comm. Print 1976) (“[S]piraling
court costs have created an absolute necessity of attorney’s fee provisions [in civil rights
statutes] . . . [t]o encourage citizens to go to court in private suits to vindicate its policies and
protect their rights.”).
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to ensure “effective enforcement of [f]ederal civil rights statutes.”
Often, though, private citizens do not have the resources to go to
court, so Congress created fee-shifting statutes to encourage litigants
28
to bring the cases. Section 1988 enticed lawyers to take civil rights
cases with indigent clients because they were more likely to be
29
compensated for their time if they prevailed.
The text of § 1988(b) states that “[i]n any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of [various civil rights statutes], the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
30
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” In many
cases in which plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees, the court has already
reached a decision on the merits of the underlying fee claim. The
rules in this situation are well-defined; plaintiffs who win on fee
31
claims can seek attorneys’ fees, and plaintiffs who lose cannot. But
when the court has not reached the merits of the fee claim but decides
the nonfee claim, the outcome is less clear. Courts sometimes avoid
deciding fee claims because of a “longstanding judicial policy of
32
avoiding unnecessary decision of important constitutional issues,”
33
commonly referred to as the avoidance doctrine. Thus courts must
decide whether to award fees without ever having reached the
constitutional issue that fee shifting is designed to help.
In deciding whether plaintiffs may seek attorneys’ fees under
§ 1988 in these Carandola-like situations, courts must decide between
two competing policy interests: encouraging civil rights suits and
protecting defendants from paying attorneys’ fees for meritless
claims. On the one hand, preventing plaintiffs from seeking attorneys’
fees in all Carandola-like situations seems to unduly punish plaintiffs
for courts’ decisions to rely on the avoidance doctrine. Plaintiffs could
bring entirely meritorious fee claims but also choose to include
27. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 209.
28. E.g., id. at 2–3, 9, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG.,
supra note 26, at 210–11, 217.
29. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (allowing a prevailing attorney
to recover more than the fixed amount of the contingency fee the plaintiff had agreed to pay);
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1984) (allowing pro bono attorneys to recover fees
under § 1988 after their clients prevailed).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
31. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
32. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 133 (1980) (quoting Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 342
(2d Cir. 1979)).
33. See, e.g., Carandola, 258 F. App’x at 518 (referring to the doctrine in this manner).
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nonfee claims. In such cases, courts, acting on their own initiative,
may invoke the avoidance doctrine and refuse to even consider the
fee claims. Plaintiffs are then forced to either exclude perfectly valid
nonfee claims from their complaints or else risk losing the
opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees for reasons entirely unrelated to
the merit of their claims.
On the other hand, in a Carandola-like situation the court has
not ruled that the defendant violated any constitutional rights, so
imposing attorneys’ fees punishes defendants without any finding of
34
wrongdoing. The text of § 1988, consistent with legislative intent,
states that courts may award fees when defendants have actually
35
Following this
violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
interpretation, courts have unanimously held that plaintiffs are not
36
entitled to fees when they lose on their fee claims. Moreover,
allowing fees in all Carandola-like cases creates a loophole in the
system and encourages plaintiffs to abuse § 1988. A clever plaintiff—
or, more realistically, a clever plaintiff’s counsel—who intendeds to
bring a state law claim could simply tack on a constitutional claim,
37
even one that is almost certainly meritless. The court would
presumably invoke the avoidance doctrine and decide the case on the
dispositive nonfee grounds, giving the plaintiff a windfall of attorney’s
fees. The Supreme Court itself has recognized this potential for
abuse: “If a litigant could obtain fees simply by an incantation of
38
§ 1983, fees would become available in almost every case.”
Accordingly, the Court has cautioned that “plaintiffs may not rely

34. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 8 (noting that the legislation was needed so that “those
who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity”); H.R. REP. NO.
94-1558, at 1, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26,
at 209 (stating that the purpose of the legislation is to give plaintiffs access to courts when “laws
are violated”).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
36. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We find no
legislative intent to treat a losing party in a § 1983 action as a ‘prevailing party’ simply because
he prevails on a related state claim.”).
37. Although this Note does not address the ethics of such tactics, it acknowledges that
jurisdictions’ rules of professional conduct may bar some abuses of § 1988. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(b) (“By presenting to the court a pleading . . . an attorney . . . certifies that: . . . (1) it is not
being presented for any improper purpose; [and] (2) [all] claims . . . are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending the law . . . .”).
38. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1003 (1984).
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simply on the fact that substantial fee-generating claims were made
39
during the course of litigation.”
The legitimate need to avoid penalizing a plaintiff for a court’s
understandable reluctance to resolve constitutional questions when
other grounds are dispositive should not “alter the requirement that a
claim for which fees are awarded be reasonably related to the
40
plaintiff’s ultimate success.” Even in cases like Carandola, which
lacked any intimation that the plaintiffs had brought their
constitutional claims as a pleading trick to obtain fees, fidelity to the
American rule and basic notions of fairness dictate that courts should
not award fees unless they have some indication that the defendants
have engaged in conduct for which Congress has specifically
authorized an award of fees. As Part II discusses, though the Court
has acknowledged the need to address these concerns, the rules
adopted by the lower courts fail to properly incorporate the Court’s
guidance.
II. PERPETUATING THE IMBALANCE: THE GAGNE RULE AND
FEDERAL COURTS’ SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT
A. Supreme Court Treatment
1. The Undesirable Rule: Maher v. Gagne. In § 1988’s legislative
history, Congress took the position that plaintiffs’ rights should trump
in Carandola-like situations. Although the text of § 1988 and the
Senate report did not mention this scenario, the House report
41
addressed it in a footnote and recommends awarding attorneys’ fees.
In that footnote, the House report identified two criteria for
determining when plaintiffs can recover attorneys’ fees. First, the fee
42
claim must be substantial. Second, both the fee claim and the nonfee
43
claim must arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact.
In dicta in a footnote in Maher v. Gagne, the Court endorsed the
44
House report’s proposed two-prong test without any modification.

39. Id. at 1007.
40. Id.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 212. The Senate report for § 1988 includes no
corresponding passage.
42. Id. (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)).
43. Id. (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
44. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 & n.15 (1980).
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The Court thus agreed that, for plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees
after prevailing on grounds other than fee claims, (1) the fee claim
must be substantial and (2) both the fee claim and the nonfee claim
45
must arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact.
This two-prong Gagne rule has substantial breadth. In essence,
the rule allows a party to seek fees if it prevails on any properly
joined nonfee claim so long as the fee claim remained undecided in
46
the case and was not frivolous. The first prong of the Gagne rule
requires merely that the fee claim be substantial, which is simply the
47
federal-question test for federal jurisdiction. A fee claim is
substantial so long as it is not “essentially fictitious,” “wholly
48
insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” or “obviously without merit.”
As one court put it,
[C]laims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions
inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that
merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not
render them insubstantial . . . . A claim is insubstantial only if “its
unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this
court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference
that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of
49
controversy.”

The first prong requires no additional inquiry into whether the
50
constitutional claim would have been likely to succeed.
45. Id. at 132 n.15 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7).
46. E.g., Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Twp. of Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 451–52 (6th Cir. 1986). In
Seaway Drive-In, Inc., the court explained that
[t]he test quoted from the legislative history [of § 1988] for determining when fees
may be awarded based on an unaddressed fee claim—i.e., the requirements that the
fee claim be substantial and that the fee and nonfee claims arise out of a common
nucleus of operative fact—is identical to [the test] that a district court must apply
when determining whether the court has pendent jurisdiction over state law
claims. . . . In other words, to hold that the constitutional claims in this case were not
substantial is to hold that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over the state
law claims.
Id.
47. E.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 551 (5th Cir. 2003).
48. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974). The legislative history cited Hagans, along
with United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), for guidance when defining
“substantial.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 212.
49. Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 581 (D.R.I. 1982) (quoting Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537–
38).
50. See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 538 (explaining that “claims of doubtful or questionable merit”
can still be substantial).
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The second prong requires only that the fee and nonfee claims
arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact; the claims do not
need any other similarities. The fee and nonfee claims share a
common nucleus of operative fact if the nonfee claim was properly
joined in the case under the federal court’s supplemental
51
jurisdiction. Courts do not have to inquire into the degree of factual
52
or legal relatedness between the fee and nonfee claims. The Gagne
rule’s expansive nature thus infringes defendants’ rights by too
readily awarding attorneys’ fees and encourages using pleading tricks
to circumvent the American rule. In fact, the Court later seemed to
regret its hasty and unquestioning acceptance of the House report’s
rule. Four years after Gagne, the Court addressed the merits of the
Gagne rule in Smith v. Robinson.
2. Subsequent Consideration: Smith v. Robinson. Although the
53
procedural history of Smith is complicated, in essence the plaintiffs
54
had alleged fee claims, which courts had not addressed, and nonfee
55
claims, on which the plaintiffs had prevailed —a Carandola-like
situation. The Court began by reaffirming the general two-prong
56
Gagne rule. Yet this time, the Court recognized the Gagne rule’s
overly broad reach and potential for abuse. It acknowledged that the
two-prong Gagne rule allowed a court to award fees any time a
plaintiff prevailed on a nonfee claim that was properly joined in a
case under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Such a test, the
Court reasoned, invited abuse: “If a litigant could obtain fees simply
by an incantation of § 1983, fees would become available in almost
57
every case.” The Court wanted more than just the presence of an
58
unaddressed fee claim in the case; it wanted some assurance that the

51. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. Gibbs is the case cited in the legislative history as a guide for
when claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7,
reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 212.
52. See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 346 F.3d at 551.
53. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 995 (1984).
54. Id. at 1007.
55. Id. at 1002 (concluding that the plaintiffs had prevailed on claims based on the
Education of the Handicapped Act, which does not authorize an award of fees).
56. See id. (“[W]hen the claim upon which a plaintiff actually prevails is accompanied by a
‘substantial,’ though undecided, § 1983 claim arising from the same nucleus of facts, a fee award
is appropriate.” (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130–31 (1980))).
57. Id. at 1003.
58. See id. at 1007 (“The fact that constitutional claims are made does not render automatic
an award of fees for the entire proceeding.”).
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relationship between the fee and nonfee claims was close enough to
59
still uphold the purpose of § 1988—protecting plaintiffs’ civil rights.
To allay these concerns, the Court held that, in addition to
meeting the two prongs of the Gagne rule, the fee and nonfee claims
60
must be “reasonably related.” Defining when claims are reasonably
related, the Court stated that when the case contains fee and nonfee
claims asking for “different relief” based on (1) “different legal facts”
and (2) different “legal theories,” the court may not award fees simply
61
because the plaintiff prevails on the nonfee claim. Gagne arguably
already prohibited—under its common nucleus of operative fact
prong—fee awards when the facts of the fee and nonfee claims are
totally unrelated. But as this Note explains in Parts II.B.2 and III.B,
the Smith opinion significantly restricts Gagne by adding a
requirement that the fee and nonfee claims share reasonably related
legal theories.
B. The Circuit Courts’ Failure to Recognize and Integrate Smith
Despite the Court’s effort to narrow the Gagne rule and
articulate a workable standard, courts have struggled to interpret
Smith. Often the end result is that they continue to apply the original
two-prong Gagne rule without properly incorporating Smith’s
restrictions (if they mention Smith at all). Since Smith, seven circuit
courts have addressed the Gagne rule. Four courts have failed to read
Smith as imposing any changes on the two-prong Gagne rule. Three
courts have found that Smith does alter the Gagne rule but have not
properly interpreted Smith’s effect to adequately protect defendants
and limit the potential for abuse. This Section’s analysis of the circuit
courts’ failure to adequately integrate Smith sets the stage for Part III,
which advocates adding Smith’s “reasonably related” language to the
Gagne test as a third factor, with a particular emphasis on whether the
fee and nonfee claims present reasonably related legal theories.
1. Failure to Recognize Smith. The Fifth, Tenth, and Ninth
Circuits have failed to read Smith as imposing any restrictions on the
two-prong Gagne rule. Two of these circuits did not recognize Smith
at all. The Fifth Circuit did not even mention Smith when discussing
whether to award fees. Instead it merely approved the original Gagne
59. See supra notes 26–29, 35–36 and accompanying text.
60. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1007.
61. Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).
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rule, holding that proper findings that courts have supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ nonfee claims make plaintiffs eligible for
62
fee awards. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit failed to impose any
requirement that fee and nonfee claims be reasonably related, leaving
defendants vulnerable to paying fees even without any indication that
they violated plaintiffs’ civil rights. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit
apparently did not recognize that Smith modifies the Gagne rule. It
framed the rule using only the original two prongs and then briefly
mentioned approvingly that the plaintiff sought the same relief for
63
both the fee and nonfee claims. Again, the court did not mention
that the fee and nonfee claims, particularly the legal theories behind
each claim, should be reasonably related.
The Ninth Circuit did acknowledge Smith as having some effect,
but not on the breadth of the Gagne rule. Instead it read Smith as
standing for the proposition that courts should interpret § 1988
64
broadly. The court merely approved the original two-prong Gagne
rule without requiring fee and nonfee claims to be reasonably
65
related.
2. Failure to Properly Incorporate Smith. Only four circuits have
tried to restrict the Gagne rule after Smith, but they ultimately have
failed to meaningfully limit the Gagne standard. Two of these
circuits—the Sixth and the Eleventh—attempted to directly
incorporate Smith’s “reasonably related” language, but they did not
give it any real weight. The Sixth Circuit interpreted Smith as
requiring plaintiffs seeking attorneys’ fees to present fee and nonfee
66
claims involving related facts or related legal theories. Thus, even if
two claims rely on drastically different legal theories, they satisfy the
Sixth Circuit’s watered-down reading of Smith so long as they are
based on the same facts because all cases arising out of a common
nucleus of operative fact share some facts. According to the Sixth
Circuit, any situation that meets the Gagne rule also meets the Smith
rule. Smith therefore imposes no actual limits on Gagne under the
Sixth Circuit’s approach. Yet the concerns expressed in Smith about
Gagne indicate that Smith was supposed to impose a limit.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 551 (5th Cir. 2003).
Plott v. Griffiths, 938 F.2d 164, 167–68 (10th Cir. 1991).
Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Garamendi, 400 F.3d 803, 810 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 808–09.
Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Twp. of Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 455 (6th Cir. 1986).
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The Eleventh Circuit took a similarly flawed approach. Unlike
earlier courts that continued Gagne’s two-prong approach, the court
67
properly read Smith as creating a new third prong—that the fee and
nonfee claims be reasonably related—in addition to the substantiality
and common nucleus of operative fact requirements of the two-prong
68
Gagne rule. But the court then defined “reasonably related” as
“aimed at achieving the same result based on the same facts or legal
theories . . . . [so that] if the fee and nonfee claims merely present
alternate theories of recovery for the same injury, they are reasonably
69
related.” Its approach thus suffers from the same defect as the Sixth
Circuit’s—it allows an award of fees if the fee and nonfee claims are
merely factually related.
The Seventh Circuit focused on the second prong of the Gagne
rule—the degree of factual relatedness required between the fee and
nonfee claims. Indirectly recognizing Smith’s impact, it modified
Gagne’s second prong—the common nucleus of operative fact
standard—requiring instead that the fee and nonfee claims be
70
“closely related factually.” To define “closely related factually,” the
Seventh Circuit adopted a standard from another Seventh Circuit
71
72
case, Lenard v. Argento. Lenard required courts to find a higher
factual similarity between fee and nonfee claims before awarding fees
73
than they must find when establishing supplemental jurisdiction —
that is, the Lenard court demanded a higher degree of factual
similarity between fee and nonfee claims than does the second prong
of the Gagne rule.
The Fourth Circuit, in Carandola, came closest to meaningfully
restricting the Gagne rule’s reach. Unlike other circuits, the Fourth
Circuit apparently did not read the substantiality and common
nucleus of operative fact requirements as equivalent to the
supplemental jurisdiction test. According to the Fourth Circuit, after

67. See infra Part III.C.
68. Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Thus, in
order to receive attorney’s fees when only nonfee claims are addressed, a plaintiff must show
that it (1) has prevailed and that the section 1983 claim (2) meets the substantiality test, (3)
arises from a common nucleus of operative fact with the nonfee claims, and (4) is reasonably
related to the plaintiff’s ultimate success.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Wis. Hosp. Ass’n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 1987).
71. Id.
72. Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1987).
73. Id. at 1245–46.
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Smith, “the non-fee claim must have been reasonably related to the
74
fee claim.” Accordingly, the court defined “reasonably related”
75
claims as ones raising “tightly intertwined” legal issues. Although
the Carandola court could have used this new language to
substantively restrict Gagne, it instead claimed that its opinion was in
line with the Tenth Circuit’s and Sixth Circuit’s decisions. It simply
ruled against the plaintiffs and distinguished Carandola from those
cases because, in Carandola, the district court had not invoked the
76
avoidance doctrine.
These circuits’ approaches prove problematic because they all
allow an award of fees merely because the fee and nonfee claims are
factually related. As Part III.B shows, factual similarity offers no
assurance that the defendant actually violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Returning to the Carandola case, if courts
imposed only a heightened factual relatedness standard, Carandola
and the other plaintiffs could recover fees because they raised
factually related claims. Both the plaintiffs’ nonfee and fee claims
stemmed from the ordinance’s enactment and the existence of the
sexually oriented businesses. Yet there was no indication in
Carandola that the City of Greensboro had actually violated the
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. A heightened factual similarity requirement simply
does not address the Smith Court’s policy concerns. As Part III.C
argues, to properly incorporate Smith into Gagne, courts must find
that fee and nonfee claims are based on related legal theories in
addition to their factual similarity.
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR HEIGHTENING THE STANDARDS UNDER
THE GAGNE RULE: ADDING A THIRD PRONG AND REQUIRING
RELATED LEGAL THEORIES
Courts should give true force to Smith’s restrictions on Gagne.
But to do so, they require a rule synthesizing the two cases that
refrains from “penalizing a litigant for the fact that courts are
properly reluctant to resolve constitutional questions if a
77
nonconstitutional claim is dispositive.” At the same time, this new
74. Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, 258 F. App’x 512, 517 (4th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 517 n.2.
77. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1007.
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rule must protect defendants from fee awards when plaintiffs merely
invoke a fee claim or when courts lack assurance that there is a
reasonable probability defendants have actually violated plaintiffs’
civil rights.
As discussed in Part II.B, courts that have considered Smith have
disagreed about how to incorporate that opinion into the Gagne rule.
Those courts have primarily taken one of three approaches. First,
some courts have strengthened the first prong of the Gagne rule and
required plaintiffs to show a greater likelihood of success on the
78
merits of the fee claim. Second, some courts have stiffened the
second prong of the Gagne rule and incorporated Smith’s reasonably
related requirement into the common nucleus of operative fact
79
inquiry. This approach requires a higher degree of factual similarity
than the original Gagne rule required. Finally, some courts have
viewed Smith’s reasonably related requirement as a separate and new
80
prong of the Gagne rule —creating a three-prong Gagne rule.
This Part argues that courts should reject the first approach
because it leads to results that completely defeat the purpose of the
Gagne rule and the avoidance doctrine. Although the second and
third tests are both feasible, the third alternative—setting “reasonably
related” as a separate and new requirement of the Gagne rule—is
most likely to provide clear guidance to courts so that they can
properly fulfill the purpose behind § 1988 while protecting defendants
from paying plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees when Congress did not intend
defendants to do so.
A. First Alternative: A Heightened Substantiality Requirement
The two-prong Gagne rule’s requirement that the fee claim be
substantial merely requires that it not be so devoid of merit that it
78. The Sixth Circuit criticized the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan for taking a similar approach. See Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Twp. of Clay, 791 F.2d 447,
452 (6th Cir. 1986) (“The District Court applied a more stringent ‘substantiality’ test than this
and improperly denied the fee request.”).
79. The Middle District of North Carolina arguably took this approach. See Giovanni
Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, No. 1:05CV1166, 2007 WL 703333, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar.
1, 2007) (mem.) (“The types of cases involving a [sic] similar pendant [sic] and § 1983 claims that
are appropriately deemed to share a common nucleus of facts are generally those in which a
plaintiff presents a number of related issues to the court, and the court reaches a decision on
one claim while abstaining from ruling on the constitutional one.”), aff’d, 258 F. App’x 512 (4th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
80. The Eleventh Circuit took this approach. Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d
1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1988).
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81

does not warrant judicial consideration. A heightened substantiality
requirement for the fee claim could help ensure that courts will
restrict the scope of the two-prong Gagne rule to situations that are
more likely to involve actual civil rights violations. Stringently
interpreted, this alternative would require courts to decide the merits
of constitutional claims if the party prevails on the nonfee claim.
Section 1988’s legislative history suggested this is the correct
approach when the unaddressed fee claim does not have
82
constitutional implications.
This alternative, however, is
inappropriate when dealing with unaddressed constitutional claims
because it completely disregards judicial hesitancy to unnecessarily
decide constitutional questions in the first place.
Alternatively, courts could require that fee claims meet a more
minimal viability standard by finding parties eligible for fees if fee
claims could survive motions to dismiss or summary judgment
motions. Although this standard would be less offensive to the
avoidance doctrine because courts would make no final decision on
the merits of the constitutional claims, it would not sufficiently restrict
the scope of the two-prong Gagne rule, and it would still require
courts to make some determination on the merits of the constitutional
claims. These requirements would restrict Gagne’s inquiry into
whether the fee claims were substantial, but they would do little to
ensure that the claims would likely succeed on the merits. For
example, a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss even though
“actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘ . . . a recovery is very
83
remote and unlikely.’” Similarly, even if a plaintiff prevailed against
a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff’s claims are not necessarily
meritorious. The Supreme Court has even stated, in a related context,
that demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
may not provide sufficient assurance that the defendant violated a
84
plaintiff’s civil rights to justify an award of fees under § 1988.
81. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
82. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 212 (“To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under one of
the statutes enumerated in [§ 1988] with a claim that does not allow attorney fees, that plaintiff,
if it prevails on the nonfee claim, is entitled to a determination on the other claim for the
purpose of awarding counsel fees.” (citing Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir.
1973))).
83. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
84. In a case considering 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff had obtained a temporary
injunction by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Wyner v. Struhs,
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Although the Court was speaking in a context outside of the Gagne
85
rule, its sentiments are telling: they indicate that even heightened
viability standards do not ensure that the claims ultimately would
have prevailed. Requiring fee claims to survive a motion to dismiss or
summary judgment standard would not sufficiently restrict the Gagne
rule because those standards provide no real assurance that the
defendant violated the plaintiff’s civil rights.
Regardless of the degree of viability courts required, imposing a
heightened substantiality standard under the Gagne rule would be
undesirable. Courts applying such a standard would likely need to
conduct a highly fact-bound inquiry into the merits of the fee claims.
Courts would struggle to administer this standard because it would
86
spawn a second round of litigation, which the Court has repeatedly
87
stressed courts should avoid. This second round of litigation would
force courts to decide constitutional issues despite their
understandable hesitancy to do so, or else it would fail to
meaningfully restrict the scope of the Gagne rule by allowing courts
to award attorneys’ fees without any indication that the defendant
violated the plaintiff’s civil rights.
B. Second Alternative: Heightened Common Nucleus of Operative
Fact Requirement
Alternatively, courts could restrict the Gagne doctrine by
requiring a heightened factual similarity between fee and nonfee
claims. Under the two-prong Gagne rule, “common nucleus of
operative fact” merely means that “if[] considered without regard to
their federal or state character, a plaintiff’s claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial

254 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1300, 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188
(2007). The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not eligible for an award of fees under
§ 1988 after failing to obtain a permanent injunction. Sole, 127 S. Ct. at 2191.
85. See Sole, 127 S. Ct. at 2191 (“This Court expresses no view on whether, in the absence
of a final decision on the merits of a claim for permanent injunctive relief, success in gaining a
preliminary injunction may sometimes warrant an award of counsel fees.”).
86. The Court employed similar reasoning when rejecting the catalyst theory as a ground
for awarding fees under § 1988. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609–10 (2001) (“[A] ‘catalyst theory’ hearing
would . . . ‘likely depend on a highly factbound inquiry’ and . . . . is clearly not a formula for
‘ready administrability.’” (citations omitted)).
87. E.g., id. at 609; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
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88

proceeding.” After Smith, some courts arguably have already read
“common nucleus of operative fact” to impose a heightened
requirement for factual similarity between fee and nonfee claims
89
beyond Gagne’s test for supplemental jurisdiction.
Logically, a heightened common nucleus of operative fact
standard would require factual similarity between fee and nonfee
claims. Under this standard, courts would find that claims are related
if they grew out of the same incident. For example, if a plaintiff who
had been beaten by the police filed a claim for excessive force and an
equal protection claim—arguing that the police beating was racially
motivated—then the claims would be sufficiently factually related
90
because both grew out of the beating. This restriction would limit
the scope of the Gagne rule by requiring a more rigorous analysis of
the factual connection between the fee and nonfee claims than Gagne
requires. This factual-similarity requirement would potentially limit
91
the pleading tricks available to plaintiffs. Moreover, it would not
offend the avoidance doctrine because courts could evaluate claims’
factual similarity without deciding the merits of the constitutional fee
claim.
Although strengthening the common nucleus of operative fact
test could restrict the Gagne rule, it fails to properly offer some
indication that defendants actually violated the plaintiff’s civil rights.
Courts could award fees as long as fee and nonfee claims were
factually related, even if the claims were not based on similar legal
92
theories. Theoretically, courts could interpret the heightened
common nucleus of operative fact inquiry to encompass both factual

88. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), cited with approval in H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH
CONG., supra note 26, at 212.
89. See, e.g., Wis. Hosp. Ass’n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 1987) (requiring courts
shifting fees to find that that the fee and nonfee claims are “closely related” factually); supra
note 79.
90. This example is taken from Lenard v. Argento, in which the court held that “[t]he
beating claim and the claim of a conspiracy to deny [the plaintiff] the equal protection of
the laws are related to each other, because they both grow out of the beating.” Lenard v.
Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 1246 (7th Cir. 1987). Lenard, however, is not within the scope of the
Gagne doctrine, because the plaintiff had prevailed on an equal protection fee claim, and so the
trial court decided the case on Hensley grounds. Id. at 1244–46.
91. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
92. The factual similarity could be conceptual or temporal. See Lenard, 808 F.2d at 1246
(analyzing claims for conceptual and temporal similarities to determine whether the claims were
related).
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93

and legal similarity. This approach, however, seems inconsistent with
the plain meaning of “common nucleus of operative fact.” Without
requiring similarity between the legal theories underpinning fee and
nonfee claims, plaintiffs could seek fees even though success on the
nonfee claims does not bear at all on success on the fee claims. Under
this test, even the Carandola plaintiffs theoretically could still obtain
a fee award. There, the plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation claim and
constitutional claim both grew out of a city ordinance affecting an
adult bookstore. Thus, the heightened common nucleus of operative
fact requirement, although feasible, would not restrict the scope of
the Gagne rule enough to offer some indication that the defendant
violated the plaintiff’s civil rights.
C. Third Alternative: Requiring Reasonably Related Legal Theories
as a Third Prong
Third, and most preferably, courts could restrict the scope of
Gagne by reading Smith as creating a new and separate requirement
for determining eligibility for fees. Under this approach, the
substantiality and common nucleus of operative fact prongs of the
Gagne rule would remain as merely federal question and
supplemental jurisdiction inquiries. Then a third prong would require
plaintiffs to show that fee and nonfee claims are reasonably related.
This approach is appealing because it avoids weakening the
restriction and emphasizes the need for a heightened inquiry into the
similarity of the claims. As Part II.B has shown, when courts fail to
view “reasonably related” as a separate inquiry, they often ultimately
94
view the Gagne rule simply as a supplemental jurisdiction inquiry.
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “there is no
certain method of determining when claims are ‘related’ or
95
‘unrelated,’” it encouraged courts to look at whether the claims dealt
96
with different facts and legal theories. Smith held that the claims
were not reasonably related when they relied on different facts, legal
97
theories, and warranted different relief. Thus, when determining
whether fee and nonfee claims are reasonably related, courts could
appropriately take one of two approaches to determine whether
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See supra note 79.
See supra Part II.B.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 n.12 (1983).
Id. at 435.
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015 (1984).
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plaintiffs are eligible for fees in light of Smith. Courts could interpret
Smith liberally and determine that parties have prevailed for § 1988
purposes so long as they present fee and nonfee claims involving
98
reasonably related relief, facts, or legal theories. Otherwise, courts
could interpret Smith as imposing a more restrictive test and view
parties as having prevailed only if fee and nonfee claims share
reasonably related relief, facts, and legal theories. Most critically
under this approach, though, courts must find that fee and nonfee
claims raise related legal theories. Although the latter option more
likely would deny prevailing-party status to plaintiffs when the Gagne
rule applies, it most effectively limits fee eligibility to situations in
which some likelihood exists that the defendant violated the
plaintiff’s civil rights without requiring courts to formally adjudicate
the constitutional claim on the merits.
The first approach—requiring that the plaintiff only show that
the fee and nonfee claims were reasonably related through relief,
facts, or legal theories—would not meaningfully restrict the Gagne
rule or offer courts any indication that the defendant violated the
plaintiff’s civil rights. Again returning to the Carandola case, a state
could enact a statute regulating sexually oriented businesses. The
plaintiff could then file a suit alleging violations of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments (a fee claim) and also argue, based solely
on statutory interpretation, that the statute did not apply to its
business (a nonfee claim). If the court ruled on the state law claim
and did not address the fee claim, counsel for the plaintiff could argue
that it is a prevailing party under the looser interpretation of
“reasonably related” because the plaintiff sought the same relief (a
declaratory judgment) and the plaintiff’s fee and nonfee claims
involve similar facts (the enactment of the statute and the content of
99
the statute as applied to the business). But a court ruling that a
statute does not apply to a particular plaintiff in no way suggests that
the statute itself violates the plaintiff’s civil rights. Allowing a party to
98. See Plaintiff-Appellants’ Supplemental Reply Brief in Case Number 07-1249, at 9,
Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, 258 F. App’x 512 (4th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2181
& 07-1249), 2007 WL 2680234 (“In Smith the Supreme Court denied fees because both of the
following were true: the claims presented by the plaintiffs advanced different legal theories and
proceeded from different facts. The logical extension of this is that claims which share either a
common factual basis or proceed from a common legal theory are sufficiently related to support
a fee award.” (citation omitted)).
99. In fact, plaintiffs’ counsel raised precisely this argument. See id. at 6–10 (arguing that
the two claims were sufficiently related because they asked for the same relief and were
factually similar).
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prevail for § 1988 purposes based solely on relief-based, factual, or
legal similarity thus does not substantively differentiate the
reasonably related standard from the common nucleus of operative
fact inquiry.
If courts instead interpret Smith restrictively and require
plaintiffs to demonstrate relief-based, factual, and legal similarity,
then the Gagne rule would allow plaintiffs to recover fees despite the
avoidance doctrine and also give at least some assurance that the
defendant violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. For example, if a
plaintiff filed a lawsuit arising from a police beating, presenting claims
under state battery laws and alleging a due process violation for
excessive force, the fee and nonfee claims would be similar enough to
meet this restrictive test. The fee and nonfee claims would, demand
the same relief (damages), be factually related (arising out of the
beating), and present similar legal theories (the unacceptable use of
force). The most important connection is that the fee and nonfee
claims—not considering the state or federal nature of the claims—
present related legal theories. This nexus helps to assure the court
that, given the success on the nonfee claim, the plaintiff was at least
somewhat likely to succeed on the fee claim without actually
requiring the court to evaluate the merits of the constitutional issue.
With the police brutality example, the success of the nonfee claim
would give the court at least some indication that the harm alleged
under the fee claim actually occurred because both claims alleged
similar harm. This more stringent approach most appropriately
addresses the fairness concerns voiced in Smith: it still respects the
avoidance doctrine, but it lets courts be more certain that a plaintiff
who prevailed on a nonfee claim would also prevail on the fee claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs should have access to the courts to vindicate violations
of their civil rights. Section 1988 provides a valuable tool to ensure
that high litigation costs do not prevent plaintiffs from realizing this
goal. Although the statute’s legislative history and the early court
decisions interpreting it understandably read § 1988 broadly to help
accomplish these statutory goals, its scope must be considered against
the backdrop of the American rule, which is “deeply rooted in our
100
Because of the rule’s
history and in congressional policy.”

100. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245–46, 271 (1975).
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importance, courts should construe exceptions to the American rule
narrowly. The Gagne rule, however, as most circuit courts have
interpreted it, extends the scope of § 1988 entirely too far.
Although courts should not punish plaintiffs by denying fees
because of courts’ hesitancy to decide constitutional issues,
defendants deserve consideration as well. Courts must take steps to
protect defendants from being forced to pay the fees of their
opponents’ counsel without any indication that the defendants have
violated the rights § 1988 seeks to protect. To balance these two
policy interests, the courts should restrict the Gagne rule. Before
finding a plaintiff eligible for fees in a Gagne situation, federal courts
should find that
1. the fee claim is substantial enough to support federal
question jurisdiction;
2. the nonfee claim and the fee claim arise out of a common
nucleus of operative fact, meaning that the nonfee claim was
properly joined under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction;
and
3. the nonfee claim is reasonably related to the fee claim
because it is based on substantially similar facts, legal theories,
and desired relief, with a particular emphasis on how related
the legal theories are.
Although this more restrictive rule would likely prevent some
plaintiffs from recovering fees even though their unaddressed fee
claims would have been successful, it properly incorporates Smith into
Gagne and addresses the Smith Court’s policy concerns. Yet this new
rule allows the heart of Gagne to survive while offering increased
protection to defendants who are otherwise vulnerable to paying
attorneys’ fees even though they did not violate plaintiffs’ civil rights.
Section 1988 was created to help plaintiffs hold defendants
accountable for civil rights violations. The modifications to the Gagne
rule this Note advocates give some assurance that defendants have
violated plaintiffs’ civil rights without requiring courts to
unnecessarily look into the actual merits of constitutional claims.
These modifications should help restore § 1988 to its original purpose
and promote uniformity among lower courts when awarding fees.

